Paying the Price? The Elements of Behavior Module #8 Red lights in the rear-view mirror! Siren! I'm not going very fast . . . only . . . only 76 miles an hour. Uh-oh. A $200 fine. Not cool. Will I speed again? It depends on how well my behavior is controlled by rules, but maybe not. For awhile. The reinforcing effects of speeding (the thrills! getting there faster! Looking cool!) may eventually take over again. Just as with (positive ) punishment (Module #6), if the reinforcers are still available, the effects of penalties may fade with time, and the behavior may re-emerge. On the other hand, penalties can work reasonably well sometimes. Everyone doesn't always drive as fast as they would like, so avoiding the penalties must be somewhat effective. Dick Malott says that penalties are not experienced as very aversive if they are small (say $1 versus $200) and easy to avoid, and small easy-to-avoid penalties can be effective. For example, if you have to pay a $1 fine to a co-worker every time you swear, you'll probably stop. If you have to pay a $2 fine every day you sit and veg out instead of walking for 30 minutes, you'll probably walk a lot more. There are actually a number of contingencies in effect in that example, including the financial penalty as well as the embarrassment, both of which punish vegging out, and both of which you may avoid (remember that?) by walking. This is how penalty works: Could you do much the same using reinforcement? Often yes . . . for example, every time you go a full day without eating candy, you can watch television. Either one can be mildly aversive (the TV example is . . . can you figure it out . . . an avoidance--negative reinforcement--contingency). As long as it's easy to avoid, either paying a penalty for the negative behavior or avoiding the aversive condition by doing something (anything) else may work fine. This is particularly true if you agree to the plan ahead of time, or design it yourself. Agents of external control (the officer writing the ticket) can become associated with the aversive consequence when someone else sets up the situation. Grounding your child after she comes in late might sometimes work, but she may not thank you at the time. Actually, there are better ways to design consequences for kids than grounding "till you're 21"; more on this in later modules, but think reinforcing desirable behavior, and using penalties that are small rather than large. Time-out, a special kind of penalty which will be described in detail in a later module, should last about a minute per the child's years of age, at maximum. A 30 year prison term, therefore, is likely to be effective with a 16 million-year-old person (if time-out were the only active contingency; it's not). Please complete the following: 1. In the boxes under this diagram, enter a behavior of yours that produced a penalty, and what the penalty was: (as a child, at work, at home): Your behavior Penalty paid Gory details: 2. Was this effective? Why or why not? 3. What side effects, if any, were there? 4. Give an example of a situation in which you could usefully "threaten" yourself with a penalty for doing something: For further information, see: Malott R. W. (1993). I'll stop procrastinating when I get around to it. Kalamazoo: Behaviordelia. Malott, R. W., Whaley, D. L., & Malott, M. E. (1997). Elementary principles of behavior (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. If you would like feedback on your answers, provide your email address and click on the submit button! Email Address: Cancel and Return to BFSR Home Page Copyright 2000 Walden Fellowship, Inc.
The Elements of Behavior Module #8
Could you do much the same using reinforcement? Often yes . . . for example, every time you go a full day without eating candy, you can watch television. Either one can be mildly aversive (the TV example is . . . can you figure it out . . . an avoidance--negative reinforcement--contingency). As long as it's easy to avoid, either paying a penalty for the negative behavior or avoiding the aversive condition by doing something (anything) else may work fine. This is particularly true if you agree to the plan ahead of time, or design it yourself.
Agents of external control (the officer writing the ticket) can become associated with the aversive consequence when someone else sets up the situation. Grounding your child after she comes in late might sometimes work, but she may not thank you at the time. Actually, there are better ways to design consequences for kids than grounding "till you're 21"; more on this in later modules, but think reinforcing desirable behavior, and using penalties that are small rather than large. Time-out, a special kind of penalty which will be described in detail in a later module, should last about a minute per the child's years of age, at maximum. A 30 year prison term, therefore, is likely to be effective with a 16 million-year-old person (if time-out were the only active contingency; it's not).
Please complete the following:
1. In the boxes under this diagram, enter a behavior of yours that produced a penalty, and what the penalty was: (as a child, at work, at home):
Your behavior Penalty paid
Gory details:
2. Was this effective? Why or why not?
3. What side effects, if any, were there?
4. Give an example of a situation in which you could usefully "threaten" yourself with a penalty for doing something:
For further information, see:
Malott R. W. (1993). I'll stop procrastinating when I get around to it. Kalamazoo: Behaviordelia. Malott, R. W., Whaley, D. L., & Malott, M. E. (1997). Elementary principles of behavior (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
If you would like feedback on your answers, provide your email address and click on the submit button!
Email Address: